






































© 2011 Didier Laussel, Ngo Van Long. Tous droits réservés. All rights reserved. Reproduction partielle permise 
avec citation du document source, incluant la notice ©. 







  2011s-41 
Strategic Separation from Suppliers of Vital 
Complementary Inputs: A Dynamic Markovian 
Approach 
 
Didier Laussel, Ngo Van Long  
 
CIRANO 
Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le financement de 
son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-membres, d’une subvention 
d’infrastructure du Ministère du Développement économique et régional et de la Recherche, de même que des subventions et 
mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche. 
CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure and research 
activities  are  funded  through  fees  paid  by  member  organizations,  an  infrastructure  grant  from  the  Ministère  du 
Développement économique et régional et de la Recherche, and grants and research mandates obtained by its research 
teams. 
 
Les partenaires du CIRANO 
 
Partenaire majeur 
Ministère du Développement économique, de l’Innovation et de l’Exportation 
 
Partenaires corporatifs 
Banque de développement du Canada 
Banque du Canada 
Banque Laurentienne du Canada 
Banque Nationale du Canada 
Banque Royale du Canada 
Banque Scotia 
Bell Canada 
BMO Groupe financier 
Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec 
Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec 





Ministère des Finances du Québec 
Power Corporation du Canada 
Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton 
Rio Tinto 
State Street Global Advisors 
Transat A.T. 
Ville de Montréal 
 
Partenaires universitaires 




Université de Montréal 
Université de Sherbrooke 
Université du Québec 
Université du Québec à Montréal 
Université Laval 
 




Les cahiers de la série scientifique (CS) visent à rendre accessibles des résultats de recherche effectuée au CIRANO 
afin de susciter échanges et commentaires. Ces cahiers sont écrits dans le style des publications scientifiques. Les idées 
et les opinions émises sont sous l’unique responsabilité des auteurs et ne représentent pas nécessairement les positions 
du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires. 
This  paper  presents  research  carried  out  at  CIRANO  and  aims  at  encouraging  discussion  and  comment.  The 
observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent 
positions of CIRANO or its partners. 
Partenaire financier  
 
Strategic Separation from Suppliers of Vital 





 *, Ngo Van Long





Résumé / Abstract 
 
Nous étudions le processus de séparation entre une firme à l’aval et des firmes à l’amont qui 
lui fournissent des inputs complémentaires. À cause d’un effet stratégique négatif, le profit 
marginal de la firme à l’aval de garder une firme à l’amont comme filiale est moins élevé que 
la valeur de cette dernière au marché des bourses. La séparation est immédiate si le nombre de 
filiales à l’amont est inférieur à un certain niveau critique. La séparation est graduelle dans le 
cas inverse et demande une stratégie mixte éventuelle. 
 





In a model where a monopolistic downstream firm (assembler) negotiates simultaneously with 
each of its intermediate-input suppliers the prices of the complementary components which 
enter its product, we analyze the process by which the assembler separates from its suppliers 
as a Markov Perfect equilibrium. Due to a negative strategic effect (the prices and profits of 
independent  suppliers  decrease  when  their  number  increases),  the  assembler's  marginal 
return from keeping an upstream subsidiary is lower than its market value as an independent 
supplier. Separation is immediate when the downstream firm's initial number of upstream 
subsidiaries is below a critical level. It is progressive in the reverse case and eventually leads 
to a mixed strategy whereby it keeps all the remaining subsidiaries with some probability, and 
sells all them off in one go with the complementary probability. 
 
Keywords: Vertical disintegration, vertical structure, Markov perfect 
equilibrium, dynamic games. 
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This paper investigates the dynamic equilibrium process by which a down-
stream monopolist tends to sell oﬀ all or some of its upstream subsidiaries
which manufacture complementary components that are intermediate inputs
for the ﬁnal product.
In some prominent sectors, such as the automobile, the aircraft or the
computer industries, one or a few downstream ﬁrms (Boeing, Toyota or IBM
for instance) buy complementary components necessary to manufacture or
assemble the ﬁnal goods (planes, helicopters, cars, computers) from a very
large number of independent suppliers.1 Moreover, there appears to be a gen-
eral tendency in these industries toward increased outsourcing of components.
According to Corswant and Fredriksson (2002), the cost of purchased mater-
ials, expressed as share of total turnover of car manufacturers, has risen from
61.7 per cent in 1988 to 63.7 per cent in 1998, and 65.7 per cent in 2003.
In the French auto industry this share was 78.1 per cent in 1990, 78.3 per
cent in 1995, 81.3 per cent in 2000, 83.7 percent in 2005 and 86.9 per cent in
20082.
Nevertheless, the degree of vertical integration turns out to vary widely
across countries. The Japanese auto industry is very disintegrated, while its
US counterpart is rather integrated.3 It was estimated that around the end
of the eighties, General Motors produced 10 cars per employee, compared
with 70 for Toyota (Shy and Stenbacka, 2003).
T h ef a c tt h a ts o m ei n d u s t r i e sr e m a i nh i g h l yd i s i n t e g r a t e dm i g h ta tﬁrst
appear to be a theoretical puzzle, since vertical integration seems to be a
s i m p l ew a yt os o l v et w od i ﬀerent negative externalities found in disinteg-
rated structures. The ﬁrst externality is the "double marginalization" which
arises because an upstream ﬁrm does not take into account the eﬀect of its
1Airbus has up to 3000 subcontractors among some 15,000 suppliers, while Boeing buys
from diﬀerent manufacturers over 34,000 components to be assembled into it 747 aircraft.
2From the "Comité français des constructeurs d’automobiles".
3See Cusumano and Takeishi (1991).
1m a r k - u po nt h ep r o ﬁto ft h ed o w n s t r e a mﬁrm. The second externality was
analyzed by Cournot (1838) in his (somewhat less well known) model of price-
setting oligopolists selling perfect complements: each upstream ﬁrm does not
internalize the eﬀe c to fi t sp r i c eo nt h ep r o ﬁts of others.4 Laussel (2008)
provided a key to this puzzle. He showed that, in the case of one downstream
monopolist buying complementary inputs from various suppliers, the down-
stream ﬁrm’s incentive to vertically integrate is limited because its acquision
of some upstream entities would reduce the price competition among the ones
who remain independent and consequently would increase their prices and
proﬁts; this would have a negative strategic eﬀe c tf o rt h ed o w n s t r e a mﬁrm.
Consequently, in an endogenous acquisition game àl aKamien and Zang
(1990), an equilibrium integration outcome occurs only when there is just
one upstream supplier5.
If there are strong negative incentives for vertical integration, it is natural
to investigate the incentives for vertical separation (i.e. selling oﬀ some up-
stream subsidiaries). This is precisely the subject of Matsushima and Mizuno
(2009) who argued that vertical separation is a "defense against strong sup-
pliers". This argument is exactly symmetric to Laussel’s (2008): vertical
separation increases competition among independent upstream ﬁrms. The
same strategic element comes into play. It is stronger the greater is the up-
stream ﬁrms’ bargaining power. Matsushima and Mizuno (2009) found that
the downstream monopolist always chooses to sell oﬀ a number of upstream
subsidiaries, and the optimal number of subsidiaries to be sold is equal to the
initial number of independent suppliers.6 However they focused on one-shot
games. This amounts to the same thing as assuming that the upstream ﬁrm
is able to commit not to sell, in the future, any of the remaining subsidiaries.
4For some theoretical studies of strategic behavior by ﬁrms producing complements,
see Economides and Salop (1992), Gaudet and Salant (1992a,b), Sonnenschein (1968).
5Notice that in a sequential acquisition game full integration is not an equilibrium when
the number of suppliers is ﬁve or more.
6Assuming that initially there are some independent suppliers, and that the initial
number of subsidiaries is greater than half of the number of upstream entities.
2In a dynamic context, if the downstream ﬁrm were allowed to reoptimize
in the future, it would indeed choose to sell oﬀ some more suppliers. If the
downstream ﬁrm is unable to commit not to sell further upstream units that
it has chosen to keep in the ﬁrst round, the potential buyers will anticipate
the continuation of the separation process. In this case, the equilibrium price
of upstream entities must reﬂect these expectations. In turn, the downstream
ﬁrm must take this into account.7
In this paper, we intend to analyze the dynamics of the separation process
when the downstream ﬁrm cannot commit to a time path of asset sale. The
basic model is the same as in Laussel (2008). It is a very simple one in which 
upstream entities are suppliers of  distinct complemetary component parts
(one entity for each component), which are used in ﬁxed proportions as inputs
by a downstream ﬁrm in the production of a ﬁnal good. Out of these ,o n l y
 −  suppliers are independent, the other  b e l o n g i n gt ot h ed o w n s t r e a m
ﬁrm. To make things simple it is also supposed that the downstream ﬁrm
is the only customer of each upstream entity. We suppose for the sake of
simplicity that the downstream ﬁrm is a monopolist in the ﬁnal good market,
and assume, as it seems natural to do when dealing with bilateral monopolies,
that the components prices are arrived at through simultaneous negotiations
between the downstream ﬁrm and each independent upstream ﬁrm.
At each point of time, the downstream ﬁrm chooses the number of up-
stream entities which it wants to sell (or possibly to buy). Given investors’
rational expectations, the price at which any upstream ﬁrm is traded equals
the capitalized value of its expected stream of proﬁts. We are interested in
the Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, in which the players’ strategies
(i.e., the upstream ﬁrm’s asset trading strategy and the investors’ asset-price
function) are both Markovian, i.e., they depend only on the state variable
which is here the current number  of upstream units belonging to the down-
stream ﬁrm.8
7This argument is of course related to the famous Coase conjecture (1972). Matsushima
and Mizuno (2009) mentioned this point, but did not formulate a dynamic game.
8By restricting attention to Markov perfect equilibria, we exclude history-dependent
3Our main results are as follows. First there is threshold value of  de-
noted by e  (which in Laussel (2008) was the minimum number of upstream
entities to buy for an exogenous merger to be proﬁtable) which plays a cru-
cial role. When the initial number of upstream subsidiaries is lower than this
value, the Markov perfect equilibrium requires the downstream ﬁrm to sell
oﬀ immediately all of its subsidiaries, and the equilibrium asset price is the
lowest possible price, i.e., the present value of the proﬁts t r e a mo fe a c ho f
independent upstream ﬁrms. In contrast,when the initial number of upstream
subsidiaries is larger than the threshold value e , the downstream monopolist
sells gradually some of its subsidiaries until the critical value e  is reached and
along this path the asset price of each independent upstream entity equals
the downstream ﬁrm’s marginal proﬁt, divided by the interest rate. At the
critical value e , the downstream ﬁrm uses a mixed strategy: it sells all e  with
some probability  and keeps all with probability 1 − . This probability 
is itself increasing in the independent upstream ﬁrms’ bargaining power and
in the total number of upstream entities, . Second, when it is optimal for
the downstream ﬁrm to sell oﬀ all subsidiaries instantaneously, its payoﬀ is
strictly greater than the payoﬀ that it would obtain if it were not allowed to
sell them. This result is contrary to the standard Coasian result that mono-
poly power vanishes when the monopolist sells assets to agents with rational
expectations.9 In contrast, when gradual vertical disintegration takes place,
the monopoly power in the asset market is completely wiped out. Third,
the threshold value e  is increasing in the market power of the independ-
ent upstream suppliers. This implies that the range of initial conditions that
would result in complete disintegration is larger when suppliers have stronger
bargaining power.10
strategies. Karp (1996a, p. 826) gives a convincing argument justifying this restriction.
Maskin and Tirole (2001) give an excellent account of the concept of Markov perfect Nash
equilibrium. For solution techniques, see Dockner et al. (2000).
9This exception to the standard Coasian outcome has some resemblance to the “gap
case” in the literature on durable goods monopoly, when the the lowest buyer valuation
exceeds the constant marginal cost of producing the durable good.
10Indeed Matsushima and Mizuno (2009) argued that the suppliers to the Japanese
4Our paper is related to two strands of literature. First, there is a literat-
ure on vertical integration, foreclosure, and vertical disintegration in a static
framework (see e.g. Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Gaudet and Long (1996),
Gal-Or (1999), Chen (2001, 2005), Lin (2006), and Matsushima and Mizuno
(2009, 2010)). However, with the exception of Matsushima and Mizuno (2009,
2010), these authors rely mainly on downstream rivalry to obtain results
for vertical disintegration. Second, there is a literature of the equilibrium
time proﬁle of durable good sales, beginning with the seminal work of Coase
(1972), which is complemented by Stokey (1981), Bond and Samuelson (1984,
1987), Kahn (1986), Gul et al. (1986), Ausubel and Deneckere (1987, 1989),
Karp (1996a,b), Driskill (1997), and further extended to the sales of shares by
a large shareholder (Gomes (2000), DeMarzo and Uroševi´ c (2006)). This lit-
erature does not deal with vertical structures. Gomes (2000) focused on moral
h a z a r da n dr e p u t a t i o ne ﬀect. He showed that risk-averse entrepreneurs divest
shares gradually over time. This gradualism is necessary for the entrepren-
eur to develop a reputation for treating minority shareholdes well. DeMarzo
and Uroševi´ c (2006) showed that if moral hazard is weak enough, the large
shareholder trades immediately to the competitive price-taking allocation.
With strong moral hazard, however, she will adjust her stake gradually. In
our model, there is no moral hazard, and it is the strength of the bargaining
power of the upstream suppliers that determines the range of initial asset
holding that is consistent with gradual sale.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider a vertical structure consisting of a downstream ﬁrm producing
a ﬁnal good and  upstream entities, each supplying a distinct vital interme-
diate input (or component) to the downstream ﬁrm. To produce one unit of
output, the downstream ﬁrm (denoted by ) needs exactly one unit of each
automakers have relatively greater bargaining power than their counterparts in the U.S.
auto industry.
5vital intermediate input. The production function of the ﬁnal good is
 = (1 2)=m i n{1 2}
where  is the amount of vital intermediate input ,a n d is the output
level. In this model,  is ﬁxed.
The intermediate inputs are produced at constant cost, assumed to be
zero for simplicity. Among the  upstream entities,  entities are exclusively
owned by  while − are independent suppliers. Let  ≡ {123 − }
denote the set of independent suppliers and  ≡ { −  +1 −  +2 }
denote the set of upstream entities owned by .L e t be the negotiated
price of vital intermediate input ,w h e r e ∈ .L e t denote the unit cost
of the ﬁnal good. It is simply the sum of the prices of the  −  vital inputs





Let  be the price of the ﬁnal good. Assume that the quantity demanded is
a linear function of  :
 = ()=1−  where  ∈ [01]


















It follows that the derived demand for the vital input  is a function of :
 =  =
1 − 
2
6The proﬁt of each independent upstream entity, at the negotiated price ,
is



























We suppose that the downstream ﬁrm negotiates separately with each
independent supplier  over the price ,w h e r e ∈ ,a n dt h a tt h e− ne-
gotiations take place simultaneously. Let 1− be the bargaining power of the
downstream ﬁrm. The outcome of the bargaining between the downstream






where  and  are the disagreement payoﬀs of the independent supplier 
and of the downstream ﬁrm, respectively. Since we assume that the inde-
pendent supplier  has no alternative customer, it follows that  =0 .O nt h e
other hand, since each of the inputs is vital, the disagreement payoﬀ of the




[(1 − (− + ))]
 £
(1 − (− + ))
2¤1−
The ﬁrst order condition yields
(1 − 2 − −) − 2(1 − ) =0
This implies that an exogenous increase in − elicits a fall in the price of
input . The symmetric equilibrium input price is
()=

( −  − 1) + 2
7As expected, the equilibrium input price is equal to their (zero) marginal
cost when the upstream entities have no bargaining power, i.e., when  =0 .
Notice that the equilibrium negotiated price  increases as the number of
independent suppliers falls. The proﬁt of each independent input supplier is
()=
(2 − )
2[( −  − 1) + 2]
2 (1)
Clearly, () is increasing in  the number of upstream subsidiaries:
 =
2(2 − )




( −  − 1) + 2
¶
() (2)
This implies that as the number of independent input suppliers falls, the
equilibrium proﬁt of each increases. (This indicates that if the downstream
ﬁrm wants to buy up the input suppliers, each of them would prefer to be
the last one to sell their ﬁrm, i.e. there is a strong incentive to hold out.)




4[( −  − 1) + 2]
2 (3)
As  →  we observe that Π() → 14 which is the proﬁto faf u l l y
integrated industry.
The joint proﬁt of the vertical structure (i.e. the sum of the proﬁts of
 −  independent suppliers and the proﬁt of the integrated ﬁrm) is
Ω() ≡ ( − )()+Π()
=
( − )2(2 − )+( 2− )2
4[( −  − 1) + 2]
2  Π() for all  .
T h el a s ti n e q u a l i t yc a nb ea c c o unted for by two sources of ineﬃciency.
First, there is the double-marginalization ineﬃciency which occurs when the
upstream entities have some bargaining power (i.e. 0). Second, when
there are several suppliers of goods that are perfect complements and they
compete in prices, their prices would be above the level that would maximize
8their joint proﬁt.11
From equation (3), it can be veriﬁed that when the downstream ﬁrm
owns one more subsidiary (i.e. when the number of independent suppliers is
reduced by one), the proﬁto ft h ei n t e g r a t e dﬁrm will rise. This monotone
increasing relationship can be ascertained by showing that Π( +1 ) 
Π() for all  ∈ {012 − 1}. It is however more convenient to proceed
under the simplifying assumption that  c a nt a k eo na n yr e a lv a l u ei nt h e





2[( −  − 1) + 2]
3  0 (4)
And the second derivative is
Π =
32(2 − )2
2[( −  − 1) + 2]
4  0 (5)
It is important to note that the marginal increase in Π induced by an increase
in , given by equation (4), is smaller than the equilibrium proﬁto fa n




2(2 − )( − )







where the right-hand side is negative if  . To provide an intuitive inter-




2(2 − )( − )
2[( −  − 1) + 2]
3 (7)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (7) is the direct eﬀect on Π of an
increase in  (it is equal to the proﬁt of an independent input supplier),
11The double-marginalization result was ﬁrst identiﬁed by Stigler (1951). The “over-
pricing” of perfect complements supplied by oligopolists (relative to their collusive price)
was discussed in Cournot (1883).
12In what follows  is not constrained to be an integer. One may argue that this is a
reasonable approximation, given the very large number of suppliers in these industries.
But this could also be justiﬁed on another ground: we allow for the possibility that the
downstream ﬁrm can own a fraction  of a given supplier. In this case, it receives a fraction
 of this supplier’s proﬁts and everything is as if it could buy a fraction  of the supplier’s
output at the (zero) unit cost.
9p*
∑P*/∑k






Figure 1: Marginal proﬁts from holding an extra supplier.
while the second term represents the indirect (or strategic) eﬀect on Π which
comes from the induced rise in the equilibrium negotiated price of inputs
supplied by the remaining independent suppliers. The fact that the marginal
proﬁt of owning one more subsidiary is lower than the equilibrium proﬁt
of an independent upstream entity provides an intuitive explanation of the
tendency for vertical disintegration in the Markov equilibrium of the dynamic
game which we investigate below. Figure 1 shows the relationship between
Π() and () for  =1 0 0 =??? and  =????. (Please delete the
asterisk * in Figure 1, at two places.)
3 Optimal disintegration when the down-
stream ﬁrm can commit
In this section we suppose that the downstream ﬁrm can commit to a time
path () which is achieved by a program of selling some subsidiaries or
buying some independent upstream entities at the market price, denoted by
10(). (Note that the total number of upstream entities is always ﬁxed at .)
We suppose that the asset price () is “correct” in the sense that it is







where (()) is given by (1). The downstream ﬁrm therefore completely
determines () by committing to a path of ().F r o m( 8 ) ,t h ee v o l u t i o no f
asset price is given by
˙ ()=() − (())
This condition is the usual non-arbitrage condition in a competitive asset
market: the return to holding an asset (namely, the sum of capital gain, ˙ 
and dividend, ) is just equal to the opportunity cost, , of forgone interest
income.
In what follows, we will treat () as a real number, where  ∈ [0],a n d
interpret ˙ () a st h er a t ea tw h i c ht h ed o w n s t r e a mﬁrm acquires (or sells, if
˙  is negative) upstream subsidiaries.
The downstream ﬁrm  (or, more precisely, the partially integrated ﬁrm),
knowing that () is determined by (8), chooses a time path ˙ () to maximize
the present value of the stream of its net receipts:







Π(()) − ()˙ ()
i










13Thus, if the downstream ﬁrm  commits to a time path ∗(), it is implicitly telling


























Thus the objective function of  becomes




−[Π(()) − (() − 0)(())] s.t. () ∈ [0].
(9)
Since the objective function (9) contains only the variable ,t h es o l u t i o n
of this optimization problem can be described succinctly as follows. For any
0  , it is optimal to make an immediate jump in the state variable (an
impulse control) to some level (0+)=, and after this initial jump, ()
will be kept constant at  for ever, where  is the value of  that maximizes
(;0) ≡ (Π()) − ( − 0)(()) subject to  ∈ [0].T h a t
is, the ﬁrm chooses its immediate net acquision,  − 0 of subsidiaries to
maximize the present value of the proﬁt ﬂow, Π, minus the cost of acquision
(i.e., the price of (()) per unit, multiplied by the number of units
acquired,  − 0). Note that in principle  − 0 c a nb ep o s i t i v e( a c q u i s i o n )
or negative (sale of some subsidiaries).










Since   0, we see that  has the sign of (20 −  − ). It follows that
the function (;0) is (i) strictly decreasing in  for all  ∈ (0] if
0 ≤ 2, (ii) strictly increasing in  for all  ∈ (0) if 0 = , and (iii)





.T h ev a l u e that maximizes (;0)
must satisfy the following ﬁrst order condition:
Π() − [()+(  − 0)()] ≤ 0 ( =0if   0)










(0 − )() (with equality if   0).
The term 1
()− 1
(0−)() is the marginal revenue from reducing
 (i.e. from selling an extra subsidiary), while the term 1
Π() is the
marginal loss of income ﬂows from operating a smaller integrated ﬁrm. At ,
the two terms are equated, unless it is a corner solution. Using (10) the ﬁrst
order condition reduces to
20 −  −  ≤ 0
This condition gives the following rule that determines the optimal number
of subsidiaries to keep after an initial sale of assets:14
 =m i n{20 − 0} (11)
T h er u l e( 1 1 )a l l o w su st os t a t eo u rﬁrst proposition:
Proposition 1 (Optimal asset sale strategy under commitment).
If the downstream ﬁrm can make binding commitment on its time path of
asset holding, its optimal policy is as follows.
Case (i): 0 = .I nt h i sc a s e , = , i.e., it is optimal not to sell any
subsidiary if ﬁrm  initially owns all the  upstream entities.





(i.e., ﬁrm  initially does not own more that half
of the number of upstream entities). In this case, ﬁrm ’s optimal action is
to sell immediately all its subsidiaries, i.e.,  =0 .





(i.e., the number of independent upstream suppli-
ers, while positive, is smaller than half of the input suppliers). In this case,
it is optimal for the ﬁrm to sell some, but not all, of its upstream assets,
causing  to jump down from 0 to a strictly positive level  =2 0 −0.
14The second order condition is satisﬁed, because 1
Π()+1
(0 −)() is strictly
quasi-concave in .






This follows from (8). Given that  is able to commit to keeping  for ever
after the initial sale, the market expects that the present value of the stream
of revenue generated by an independent upstream entity is ().
Remark 3.2: If the downstream ﬁrm can commit to the open-loop










where the term inside {} represents the proceeds from the immediate sale
of (0 − ) subsidiaries.
Remark 3.3: The solution described in Proposition 1 displays the prop-
erty of time-inconsistency in case (iii). In this case the open-loop strategy
of holding ()=2 0 − 0 for all  ∈ (0∞) implies that at any time
1  0,i fﬁrm  would be released from its original commitment, it would
again want to sell immediately some more subsidiaries, and a price below the
initial price (). This action would inﬂict capital losses to the previous
buyers of subsidiaries, because they have been fooled into believing that the
downstream ﬁrm would sell assets only once. Solutions that display time-
inconsistency are generally regarded as unacceptable (Coase, 1972). There-
fore we must look for time-consistent solutions.
4 Markov-perfect equilibrium
In this section, we seek solutions that have the time-consistent property, and,
in addition, that would be robust to perturbation. More precisely, we are in-
sisting on a stronger property than time-consistency, namely Markov perfect
14equilibrium.15 In a Markov perfect equilibrium, ﬁrm  uses a Markovian
strategy  and the market has a Markovian price function, or expectation
rule,  (which we will explain in more detail below) such that (i) given ,
the Markovian strategy  maximizes ﬁrm ’s payoﬀs, for all possible starting
(state, date) pairs (),a n d( i i )g i v e n, the Markovian price function  is
consistent with rational expectations.16
We assume that all investors (potential buyers of assets) have a common
Markovian asset price expectation rule  = (), i.e., the asset price expected
to prevail at any time  is a function of the concurrent level () of the state
variable. The function () maps [0] into the set of positive real numbers,
and we permit  to be piece-wise continuous in . A Markovian expectation






where  is the expectation operator, and {()}
∞
 denotes the time path of
the state variable induced by the use of the Markovian strategy  from time
 when the state variable takes the value .
We now seek to describe plausible Markovian strategies for ﬁrm .W e
know that if 0 = ,t h eﬁrm is a fully integrated monopoly, so there is no
gain in selling assets. We restrict attention to the set of initial conditions
0 ∈ [0). We suppose that a strategy  speciﬁes some positive real number
 ≤  with which the set [0) is partitioned into three disjoint subsets, [0),
{},a n d() where the set {} is a singleton.
We will show that if the initial condition  is in the set [0),t h e nt h e
ﬁrm will make a lumpy sale  = () which causes a jump in the state
variable, with jump size  ∈ [ − ] i.e., if (0) = 0 then (0+)=0 − .
Note that  can in principle be positive or negative; a positive (negative) 
15For an exposition of the concepts of time-consistency and Markov perfect equilibrium,
and a proof that Markov perfect equilibria are time-consistent, see Dockner et al. (2000).
Long (2010) provides some simple examples.
16For some examples of Markovian price function in the industrial organization literat-
ure, see Driskill and McCaﬀerty (2001), and Laussel et al. (2004).
15means a downward (upward) jump, i.e. a lumpy sale (purchase) of assets.
The function (),d e ﬁned over [0),i ss p e c i ﬁed by the strategy .
We will also show that if the initial condition is in the set (),t h e nt h e
ﬁrmwill apply a gradual purchase/sale policy () such that ˙  = () where
 is a bounded function, i.e., there is no jump in the state variable when
 ∈ ().I f()  0 (respectively,  0)w es a y st h eﬁrm engages in gradual
purchase (resp., gradual sale). The function ,d e ﬁned over (), is speciﬁed
by the strategy .
The point  is called the “junction point.” If the initial condition is at a
junction point, i.e. if  = , we allow the ﬁrm to use a mixed sub-strategy: to
make a lumpy sale of size  with probability  and to stay put (i.e. neither
buy nor sell) with probability 1−.( T h er e a ln u m b e r s and  are speciﬁed
by the strategy .)
Thus, a strategy  is a tuple (). Given the market expectation
function , ﬁrm  chooses a strategy  to maximize its expected payoﬀsf o r











˙ ()=(()) if () ∈ ()
(
+)=() − (()) if () ∈ [0)
(
+)=( 1− )()+[() − ] if ()=
We deﬁne a Markov-perfect equilibrium as a couple (∗ ∗) such that
(i) given the market expectation rule ∗,t h es t r a t e g y∗ ≡
(∗ ∗ ∗
∗∗) maximizes ﬁrm ’s expected payoﬀ for any starting point
()
(ii) given the strategy ∗, the market expectations are rational.
We now characterize Markov-perfect equilibria. We begin with a few ob-
servations.





, the Markov perfect
equilibrium would dictate ﬁrm  to sell all of its upstream subsidiaries. This
is because the commitment equilibrium, which would dictate the same action,





.17 We state this result as Lemma 1.





then the equilibrium Markovian strategy dictates

















is also the solution
of ﬁrm ’s optimization problem when commitment is possible, and it is
time-consistent because after the sale,  has no more upstream assets to
oﬀer to the market. Therefore buyers will not be caught by surprise later in
the game. It follows that the equilibrium is Markovian with the expectation
function  such that ()=1











? Recall that if commitment were possible,





, ﬁrm  would commit to the immediate, once-only
sale of only a fraction of its subsidiaries, and keep  subsidiaries for ever,





and would remain the same ever after. However, if commitment is not pos-
sible, no one is willing to buy a subsidiary at the price 1
(),b e c a u s e
everyone expects that ﬁrm  will renege from its initial announcement, and
will sell some more subsidiaries in the immediate future, inﬂicting a capital
loss to the early buyers. This outcome would be inconsistent with rational





would the Markov per-
fect equilibrium requires ﬁrm  to sell oﬀ all subsidiaries immediately? If
17The commitment equilibrium is time-consistent in this range because after the imme-
diate sale at time 0+, ﬁrm  has no more subsidiaries to sell.
17not, what is the upper bound on 0 such that the policy of selling oﬀ all
subsidiaries immediately is better than keeping all of them for ever?
Selling all 0 immediately would give  the sale revenue of 0(0).
In addition to this, ﬁrm  would also earn a stream of proﬁt Π(0) per unit
of time after the sale of all its subsidiaries. The sum of these two sources of








Consider an alternative policy, that of keeping 0 for ever. The capitalised
value of the resulting income stream would be 1
Π(0).
Lemma 2: The set of 0 such that (0) is greater than or equal to
1













9(2 − )2 +8 ( 2− ) (14)
Proof:O b s e r v et h a t1
Π() is a strictly convex function of  in [0],a n d
() is linear in ,w i t h(0) − 1
Π(0)=0 ,a n d0(0) − 1
Π(0)  0.
Therefore the function ()− 1
Π() is strictly concave and its value is equal
to zero at exactly two points,  =0and  = e ,w h e r ee is the unique










3(2 − )+4  −
p
9(2 − )2 +8 ( 2− )
i
 0¥
Remark 4.1: L e m m a2i m p l i e st h a te  is the threshold number of subsi-
diaries below which ﬁrm  would prefer selling them all at once to keeping
18The condition Φ()=0yields a cubic equation, of which one of the roots is zero. The
other two roots are real and of opposite signs. We select to positive root e . Laussel (2008)
shows that e  is bounded below by 23 (it tends to 23 as  → 0, and it is increasing in
),a n de  is strictly smaller than 1 for all ﬁnite .
18them all for ever.19Thus, we can conclude that if 0  e , it is not optimal to
sell oﬀ all subsidiaries immediately. Obviously, e  is a logical candidate for ∗
when we fully characterize the strategy ∗ ≡ (∗ ∗∗
∗∗).





 the policy of selling oﬀ all subsidi-
a r i e si sb e t t e rf o r than any policy of gradual sale that meets the rational
expectations requirement? The answer is provided in Lemma 3 below.





then, facing a Markovian market expectation
function (), to sell assets gradually cannot be an equilibrium strategy.





.The policy of selling all subsidiaries
immediately gives ﬁrm  the payoﬀ 1
Π(0)+0(0).S u p p o s et h e
ﬁrm considers an alternative strategy, say  , of selling its upstream entities
gradually until some level b  (where 0 ≤ b  0 ≤ e ) is reached, at which
point it will sell all of b . We will show that this alternative policy violates
the necessary conditions of ﬁrm ’s optimal behavior, given the rational





































subject to (0) = 0 and ()=b .L e t denote the co-state variable. The
Hamiltonian function is
 = Π() − ()˙  + ˙ 
19As shown in Laussel (2008), for all 0,t h er a t i oe  is increasing in  and tends
to 1 as  tends to inﬁnity.








= () − Π(())+˙ ()
0(()) for all  ∈ [0]
(18)









=0 , i.e. ()=(b ) (19)
Diﬀerentiating equation (17) gives
˙ ()=˙ ()
0(()) (20)
From (18) and (19),
()=Π(()) (21)












Now, diﬀerentiating the market expectation rule (16), we get

0()˙  = () − () (24)










˙  = −

3(2 − )
( − )[( −  − 1) + 2]  0 (26)
20See, e.g., Leonard and Long (1992, Chapter 7).






















and ˙ 0 by (25). Consider the possibility that b  =0 .
Then equation (26) together with the boundary conditions (0) = 0 and












¢ for  ∈ [0]













This implies that, according to the Markovian market expectation rule (),








However, the present value of the income stream generated by an asset from















This upward jump in asset price is inconsistent with rational expectations.
It follows that b  =0is not admissible either.





is not consistent with equilibrium.¥
21See Appendix.
21It remains to ﬁnd the equilibrium strategy for other initial conditions,









the equilibrium policy is to sell the assets
gradually, until  reaches the value e .
Lemma 4:
(i) For 0 = e  :
At  = e , ﬁrm  sells all of its subsidiaries with probability  and keeps
all its subsidiaries with probability 1−,w h e r e is speciﬁed below. While ﬁrm
 is indiﬀerent about the value of , the requirement that market expecation















i.e. the expected value of the dividend ﬂow of an independent upstream en-
tity (the left-hand side of equation (27)) is equal to the value of the market
expectation function () evaluated at e .22









then in equilibrium ﬁrm  sells its assets gradually until













(iii) The equilibrium market expectation function () is piece-wise con-
























22Solving for ,o n eg e t s
 =
16[ − 3(2 − )]
















Remark 4.2: From equations (28), (29) and (30), () is piece-wise dis-
continuous in ,w i t h
lim
↑ 
()  (e )=l i m
↓ 
().
Investors who purchase the asset when e  do not make losses when  ↓ e ,
because the non-arbitrage condition (12) holds for them.
P r o o fo fl e m m a4 :Since the right-hand side of (15) is equal to zero when
evaluated at e , we know that when 0 = e , ﬁrm  is indiﬀerent between (a)
keeping e  subsidiaries for ever, and (b) selling them all immediately. Either












However, if ﬁrm  were to choose action (a) with probability 1, the market












while if  were to choose action (b) with probability 1, then (0+)=0 ,a n d












If  randomizes its choice of action at e  using probability  for (b) and
1 −  for (a), the market expectation is
(e )=( 1− )1 + 2 (34)
We will determine  toward the end of this proof.









, ﬁrm  solves the following ﬁxed endpoint problem:











23where (e ) is given by (31), subject to (0) = 0 and ()=e  (ﬁxed)
The solution to problem (35) can be found by using either the maximum
principle, or the dynamic programming approach.
(A) solution using the maximum principle
Let  denote the current-value Hamiltonian and  denote the current-
value shadow price. Then
 = Π(()) − (())˙ ()+()˙ ()
Then, using an argument similar to that used in the proof of Lemma 3, we
deduce that
˙  = −

3(2 − )
( − )[( −  − 1) + 2]  0







−  + 
2−
 1 for 0  e 














(B) solution using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation



















(0) if 0 ≤  ≤ e 
1
Π() if e  ≤  ≤ 
















24For a ﬁnite ˙  to be optimal, it is necessary that





Substitute this into (39) to get

































where (e ) denotes the expected asset price at  = e . Condition (44) is
necessary to suuport the equilibrium, because if (e )  1
Π(e ) then no
one would want to buy assets when  is greater than e  (they would be making
capital losses when  reaches e ). And if (e )  1
Π(e ), everyone would
make capital gains by delaying purchases until  is just inﬁnitessimally above
e 





While equations (43) and (45) indicates that the market expectation func-
tion is discontinuous in , we can see that in equilibrium, the path of expected
asset price () is continuous, i.e.  is a continuous function of time. From
25 k
    P(k)
P(0)+kp(0)
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, the asset price will be falling continuously, until  reaches
e , at which point the asset price will jump up to 1
(e ) with probability
1 −  a n dj u m pd o w nt o1
(0) with probability .¥
Remark: Equation (38) shows that, in a game where  can buy or sell




, its Markov-perfect equilibrium payoﬀ is just equal to
what it would earn in the alternative scenario where it were not allowed to




,i t sM a r k o v -
perfect equilibrium payoﬀ is higher than what it would earn in the alternative
scenario.
We can now state our main proposition.
Proposition 2: The Markov-perfect equilibrium of the asset pur-
chase/sale game is as follows.
1. Firm  sells immediately all its downstream subsidiaries if e .
2. If  = , ﬁrm  keeps all its subsidiaries for ever.





























This will continue until e  is reached in ﬁnite time.
4.If  = e , ﬁrm  will sells all e  immediately with probability ,a n d
keep all e  for ever with probability 1 − 












Π(e ) if  = e 
1








, the downstream ﬁrm’s equilibrium payoﬀ is strictly greater
than what it would earn in the alternative scenario where it were not allowed












Figure 4: The probability of selling all subsidiaries at  = e .
5 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the dynamics of vertical disintegration imply either a
very quick (in fact instantaneous) convergence toward a fully disintegrated
structure, when the initial number of upstream subsidiaries is small, or a very
slow process of separation which may take many years, when when the ini-
tial number of upstream subsidiaries is large. The model yields the prediction
that one should observe either very disintegrated vertical structures or very
integrated ones slowly evolving through progressive outsourcing. It also pre-
dicts that it is more likely to reach a ﬁnal stage of full disintegration when the
upstream ﬁrms’ bargaining power is great. These predictions are consistent
with empirical evidence: ﬁrst, as stated in the introduction, there is a tend-
ency to vertical separation; second, the Japanese auto industry, where the
component suppliers have a greater bargaining power, is much more disin-
tegrated than its US counterpart. Of course, the instantaneous disintegration
result, in the case where the initial number of subsidiaries is lower than the
28critical value, appears somewhat brutal. But this outcome would have been
mitigated, had we introduced some adjustment costs. This is a possible exten-
sion of this paper. Another direction of generalization would be to consider
several competing downstream ﬁrms. In the latter case, at least if donstream
ﬁrms compete in prices, we conjecture that this would reinforce the tendency
toward outsourcing which would be, in addition to being a defense against
strong suppliers, a way to soften downstream competition.
Appendix
A.1 Proof : solution of the main diﬀerential equation
Deﬁne
 ≡  − 























Multiply both sides by −2























































































































































































































−  + 
2−
 1 for 0  b 
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